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Is Community Based Policing the Answer? Yemen's Fight against AQAP

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Is Community Based Policing the Answer?

Yemen's Fight against AQAP

By

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Abstract

Throughout history we have seen drastic changes in methods for combating terrorism; however, as a society we have never been able to find an effective solution. In recent years we have seen countries use community based policing in an effort to fight terrorism at home; how would adopting community based policing efforts help or hurt countries throughout the Middle East in combating terrorism? I believe that implementing community based policing into these countries would drastically improve civilian and government relationships as well as hinder terrorists' ability to recruit new member from these areas. I conduct a multi-case study then apply those models to the country of Yemen to simulate how the policies would affect the ability to combat Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. For this, I compare community based policing in the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel to get a better picture of which model would be most effective in the country of Yemen.

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Introduction

In today's world, every time someone turns on the news terrorism is talked about in some capacity. It has become common place to hear about terrorist attacks around the world or the wars being fought against terrorist groups throughout the Middle East. As the issue becomes more salient, everyone develops an opinion of how to fight against terrorism. With so many different opinions on how to rid the world of terrorism, it forces society to rank the ways different places believe in fighting terrorism. For example, the majority of the American society often believes that the way to fight against terror is through warlike mentality and use of direct force against the terrorist organization, particularly the use of the military in a foreign land but after over a decade of fighting against terrorist groups with this thought process the question must be asked if there is a better way to combat terrorist and the reach that they possess.

Yemen is currently one of the hotbeds for terrorism, particularly for the group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP is one of the most dangerous off shoots of al-Qaeda both within the country it operates as well as abroad. This current state of Yemen is a major factor in the success of AQAP, particularly since it controls nearly as much territory as the more legitimate government of Yemen. At the current point in their short history, Yemen is having serious trouble providing for its own civilians opening the door to allow AQAP to gain legitimacy with the people of Yemen. In the southern regions of Yemen, where AQAP is a pseudo government actor, the lack of government services and support are virtually nonexistent. AQAP continues to take advantage by providing the people with infrastructure needs like roads and water. The ability to provide

these basic needs, AQAP gains support and safety from the citizens of these regions. As AQAP continues to push for legitimate power, citizens have begun to accept some of the terrorists' extreme views because it is the only way to continue getting the vital services they need to survive. The lack of true governmental control in the region also completely tears down the ability for the civilians to trust and respect the government. With the governmental failure on every level, this is where implementing a method of community policing could take a weakness and make it into strength. Community policing is based on the philosophy that "the police are the people and the people are the police and crime prevention is possible without heavy intrusion into citizen's lives" (Lewis 2011). Alternatively, if left in its current state, Yemen may not be able to survive as a country. However, there are numerous ideas on how to help solve the problem.

While the literature is filled with well thought out strategies that could be implemented for combating terrorism, the status quo seems to focus on letting the United States led the effort, instead of allowing the Yemeni Government to help itself. Plans from authors like Zimmerman (2016), Sohlman (2012) and McIntosh (2015) all include a United States led offensive on AQAP. We have seen this theory in practice over the past decade without much success in Afghanistan and Iraq. This seems to be an idea that is less popular because most of the writing comes from a western perspective, and there is a tendency to want to be the star of the show. While this may be a possible step, I believe it is more important to give the Yemeni people the chance and ability to fight for themselves with the US taking an advisory role. In this advisory role, you allow the Yemeni Government to solve the issues and gain more legitimacy throughout the global community. Some current authors have written that community based policing can help

in counter-terror efforts throughout The United States, England, and Israel. Gill (2014) and Grabosky (2008) both agree that community policing helps improve the civilian and governmental trust. The community based policing models help to provide the legitimacy from the global community because of its ability to solve a lot of the societal issues that the Yemeni Government has brought upon itself.

Therefore, if counter-terrorism has been unsuccessful thus far; how would community based policing tactics help or hinder the country of Yemen? This paper provides an alternative plan to combat the presence of AQAP through an implementation of a community based policing model. Community based policing models differ throughout the world as to how it is used to combat terrorism. Through a multi-case study, it will be evident that community based policing in England, Israel, and The United States is a viable solution to combat terrorism. The differences in the plans however leave this study to decide which model would be most effectively implemented into Yemen. The Israeli model is one that is more built in to the fabric of the policing and military structure because of the constant threat the country faces from terrorism much like Yemen. The United Kingdom model is a multi-pronged system designed to stop the grass route movements and the recruiting abilities of the terrorist organizations that make them more dangerous. The United States model is a hybrid model that takes civilian volunteer power along with the fighting to stop homegrown terrorism to completely eliminate the threat of terrorism. I believe that the most successful counterterror plan for Yemen is a community based policing model that allows Yemen to deal with its internal strife while slowing the growth, and eventually eliminating, AQAP.

To begin I review the background of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the theories of community policing. Then I explore the current literature that is relevant to the topic at hand. Following the literature review, I provide the theoretical framework for why community based policing would help the country of Yemen combat its problems with AQAP. Lastly, I review the data that was collected and analyze what solution would likely come out of community policing in Yemen.

Background

Yemen is an extremely young country that is still trying to truly figure out there place in the world. The northern part of the country gained independence in 1918 from the Ottoman Empire and took the name of the Yemen Arab Republic. While the southern portion along the Sea of Aden was not relinquished by the British until 1967, they became the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Yemen is directly below Saudi Arabia with both the Sea of Aden and the Arabian Sea to the along the sudden border. The country finds itself in some state of disarray for the majority of its history. It wasn't until 1990 that the two former colonies decided to unite as the Republic of Yemen, but a short four years later they had their first civil war. Luckily this southern secessionist movement by the south was quickly quashed and in 2000 they country of Yemen made official borders with the Saudi Arabia. Once again, it only took four years before another civil war, this time between the northern Shi'a Muslim minority, which only makes up 35 percent of the population, and the Yemeni Government, who are Sunni Muslims that make up 65 percent of the population. It was six years until they reached a cease-fire agreement, but this doesn't end the hostility because another southern secessionist movement was reinvigorated in 2008 when they saw corruption leading to high

unemployment rates and a poor economy. This poor economy has seen a drop off of over thirty-three billion dollars in the past two years from \$106.6 billion to \$73.45 billion due to the most recent conflict plaguing the country. The on going conflict has also seemingly made the Yemeni government powerless when it comes to their own economy as exports have been almost completely nullified, accelerated the inflation within the country, made food and fuel imports hard to come by and widespread infrastructure failures. The CIA world factbook estimate that approximately eighty-two percent of the population in Yemen is in need of some sort of humanitarian assistance.

As noted above, over the past five years the country of Yemen has been in a devolving state of emergency that has resulted in a civil war. Since 2011, a failed political transition weakened the Yemeni Government enough to allow the rise of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) throughout the country. AQAP has taken advantage of the Civil War between the Houthis, a group that represents the Zaidi Shia minority in Yemen, and the current President Hadi's regime. The Houthi movement "took advantage of the new president's weakness by taking control of their northern heartland of Saada province and neighboring areas" (BBC). The Houthi rebels have been able to maintain northern stronghold even now and the pro-government supports have been unable to gain any ground in their fight against the rebels.

"Since the beginning of April 2015, AQAP has taken advantage of the war raging between armed Houthis — who have controlled the capital, Sanaa, since September 2014 — and Hadi's forces backed by Saudi Arabia" (Despite Arab, US Attacks, AQAP Still Holding out in Yemen.) The civil war in Yemen left an opening that AQAP was able to capitalize on by creating "its own mini-state, flush with funds from raiding the local

central bank and levying taxes at the local port” (Bayoumy et al). Currently, AQAP has adopted similar tactics to those used by the Islamic State to control Syria and Iraq to expand its control over the southern portion of Yemen. It creates a further worry that slowly AQAP will be able to indoctrinate and recruit more of the local population towards its extremist views. One 47-year-old resident of Al Mukalla, the current stronghold for AQAP in Southern Yemen, said, “I prefer that al Qaeda stay here, not for Al Mukalla to be liberated. The situation is stable, more than any ‘free’ part of Yemen. The alternative to al Qaeda is much worse” (Bayoumy et al). This current opinion of the AQAP makes them an immediate threat towards the democratic future of Yemen.

AQAP has gone as far as to try and gain actual recognition as a viable option for a Government of Yemen. AQAP sent the current Government of Yemen an official government document to sell crude oil while allowing the group to keep 25 percent of the profit. The government rejected the offer and maintains limited governmental control in the southern portion of Yemen where AQAP has created a pseudo governmental regime by “imposing tax and custom tariffs on shippers and traders” (Bayoumy et al). These practices have led to a projected daily two million dollars a day earnings to the AQAP. They have also begun a drastic change in their antics in relation to civilians. They have changed from suicide bombing campaigns and attacks on US bound airliners and now they are beginning to extort state run industries, like the oil and mobile phone companies. These extortions have led the AQAP to be able to capitalize what Elizabeth Kendall, an Oxford University expert on Yemen, calls the “Robin Hood” strategy. The group has cancelled payroll taxes in the areas in which it controls, along with often posting propaganda of fighters fixing local infrastructure needs like roadways and medical

supplies. Doing these things allows the organization to gain support because they are providing what the government does not in that area. The payroll tax cuts that the group made happen allows an economically struggling area try to rebuild and the infrastructure gains helps the citizens feel that their quality of life is improving under AQAP garnering the support the group needs to gain legitimacy and keep control over the area.

Robert Peel is the father of modern community policing and a proponent of social, economic and legal reform that has lasted for more than 40 years. Peel's first political post led him to try and fix the inability to fight crime in Ireland. This issue could make or break a political career at this time and it allowed Peel to make his career. Peel's first change to the system in Ireland used the magistrates within Ireland to influence the local populations to better help law enforcement. These magistrates were already well respected leaders of local areas of Ireland. The job of the magistrate is to lead the prevention of crime in their locales instead of waiting to suppress the crime. This plan however didn't work because of the inability of the magistrates to perform the duties he prescribed for them. Enter the initial version of community policing as he established *Irish Peace Preservation Force (IPPF)*. The IPPF was put into place in order to help the magistrates complete their tasks or to force the magistrates to perform their duties more efficiently. Peel put the IPPF in place because of the burden financially it forced onto the local areas to pay for the presence of the new officers. Magistrates took notice and started to perform the duties that they were given. As policing got better in certain areas it allowed more focus to be put into the truly bad areas. This first lesson allowed Peel to change how policing was thought about. Peel went on to write the Nine Peelian Principles of Law Enforcement. "These principles essentially held that the police are the

people, the people are the police, and crime prevention is possible without heavy intrusion into citizens' lives" (Lewis 2011). The Peelian Principles focus on the relationship of the police officer with the citizens they are protecting. The principles were given to every new police officer so that they could use them to become a successful officer. These are still the same basic principles that are the foundations of modern community policing, however, over time these have been adapted to fit the advancement of humanity.

Literature Review

In this section I review the current literature on three topics, the current counter-terrorism strategy in the country of Yemen, how the authors believe that counter-terrorism *should* be approached, as well as how community policing can be used as a counter-terrorism strategy and why it has been successful around the world. The most common themes among possible counter-terrorism strategies in Yemen is that, much like the current unsuccessful United States led counter terror method, we should taking a war like mentality into the battle against terrorism but that has seemed to fail thus far. Alternatively, community policing has been shown throughout the world that it is possible to fight all forms of crime.

"Historically, the United States has avoided actions that offer any political legitimacy to terrorist organizations for fear that it would contribute to a perception that terrorism works and encourages other groups to utilize the tactic" (McIntosh 2014). McIntosh points out a severe change in the current United States strategy against al-Qaeda from previous terror organizations. The Bush Administration has forever changed

the political standing that al-Qaeda has on the world stage. As long as the United States maintains its status, the more powerful al-Qaeda will continue to become. As McIntosh continues “As long as the United States remains at war, similarly motivated individuals and groups will see al Qaeda as an entity worth supporting” (McIntosh 2013). This is a major topic of discussion within the foreign policy community because it is the next evolution in counter-terrorism. President Obama used the term *effective destruction* when describing his administration’s plan to battle against the group. However, the administration’s plan is focused on drone attacks, which author Eva Sohlman sees as a major problem currently within Yemen. “Many Yemenis see the drones as violating Yemen’s national sovereignty, and they are fueling anti-American sentiment. There are also concerns that civilian casualties work as recruitment tools for al Qaeda” (Sohlman 2012). This new plan is actually having a counterproductive effect on what was needed within the country. Instead of continuing to build the bond between the United States and Yemen in their fight against al-Qaeda, the plan has turned more citizens against America and in turn is less likely to help the government in the war. However, Sohlman continues on to mention how the Ambassador to Yemen believed the battle should be fought, “Assessing U.S. policy in Yemen, Ambassador Hull, who has long argued that the United States needs to implement a sustained two-pronged approach with a focus on security and development, said that even before the current turmoil, U.S. counter-terrorism inside Yemen has been largely ineffective” (Sohlman 2011). With the Ambassador of Yemen believing that the current plan of action by the United States led coalition, listening to his idea seems like the most prudent course of action. As Sohlman continues, “A comprehensive focus on Yemen’s economic and political problems, it (a letter written by

Ambassador Hull along with Yemeni officials) continues ‘will better serve the stability of Yemen and, accordingly, our national security interests, rather than ... direct military involvement’ (Sohlman 2011). McIntosh dives further into the unsuccessful nature of the United States’ plan of action against AQAP.

The U.S. Strategy vis-à-vis Al Qaeda has created a catch-22 – the proves of fighting the war on Al Qaeda makes it increasingly difficult to achieve the stated end of eradicating the threat from Al Qaeda. Unlike a war with a state or a breakaway group, so long as Al Qaeda merely exists it remains “un-defeated” both in a literal sense and in terms laid out by the Obama administration – “effective destruction”... If negotiating an end to the conflict is off the table because it recognizes the continuing existence of Al Qaeda then war is likely to continue indefinitely. (McIntosh 2015)

McIntosh brings light to an important problem with a war-like strategy to combat terrorism in the fact that there is no end because of the language and tactics used focused on the only end coming via the eradication of a worldwide terror organization. The likelihood of achieving a complete stop in the recruiting of al-Qaeda along with being able to track down and bring to justice every member of the group is very slight. Taking any end that involved negotiating out of the equation because that would recognize the group and give them even more recognition and power hindering the ability to stop the threat that al-Qaeda poses to the world. Author Christina Hellmich has her own sense of the problems that exist and where they have gone wrong in Yemen. Hellmich’s first point revolves around the need for the current regime and President Hadi’s ability to consolidate the powers within the government. “While this election enjoyed the support of both the ruling party and the opposition and has been hailed by the international community as a success for democracy, the fact that he was the sole candidate suggests that Yemen still has some way to go before it achieves political maturity” (Hellmich 2012). For Yemen to ever have an ability to truly defeat AQAP, they must come together

as a country. If the country can't unite, it is facing three different groups training to gain control of an already fragile region. This continued conflict only serves to hinder any progressive development from taking place. Hellmich talks about this lack as development as another issue that must be figured out before Yemen has a chance to reduce the footprint that AQAP has.

Nearly half the population lives on less than US\$2 per day; national unemployment is at 40 percent; less than 40 percent of Yemeni households have access to safe water and electricity; 50 percent of Yemenis are illiterate.³⁸ Yemen's crude death rate and crude birth rate are estimated at 9.0 and 39.7 per 1,000 population, respectively, while the fertility rate of 4.1 ranks among the highest in the region.³⁹ State funded health and educational services are abysmal. Corruption and inefficiency, for which the country is notorious, are linked to the government's inability to provide adequate social services at the most basic level.

These statistics show that the country is not prepared for any sort of conflict because the conflict hinders any humanitarian aid that Yemen may receive to try and fix these issues. These statistics also create a large issue because, as stated above, AQAP is exploiting the citizen's need for some of the basic necessities of life, and their using their ability to provide these necessities they gain the support of the citizens that they are helping.

Community based policing has become the newest trend in crime prevention, particularly in the western world to prevent terrorism. In the post 9/11 world, the more people you have looking for the signs of possible trouble the more likely that the trouble can be stopped before any incident can happen. The White House released a publication in August of 2011 highlighting the new plan for the United States to counter the possibility of terrorism on its soil. It states that the federal government will do more to support local communities in order for those local law enforcement agencies to gain the trust of the citizens. This is a large step in showing why community based policing

should be an effective strategy in combating terrorism when it has been implemented in the hegemonic power. As author Peter Grabosky puts it “They have been encouraged to look upon the public as clients, and to develop a customer focus. In many western democracies, role of police is now to serve, rather than to dominate” (Grabosky 2008). This shifts the power structure away from the police and into the hands of the public, and when this shift occurs the police will be able to gain the trust allowing them to catch terrorists who are committing other petty crimes in order to fund and carry out terrorist attacks. Charlotte Gill conducted a study to “investigate the extent which community-oriented policing impacts crime, disorder, fear of crime, citizen satisfaction with police and police legitimacy...” (Gill 2014) Her results showed that community policing strategies increase the public satisfaction, police legitimacy, and the citizens’ response to disorder however it could not identify whether community policing made people fear crime less or if it had an effect on officially recorded crimes. Community policing allows for the ability to stop what Bonino (2012) identifies as the four major strategies driving international terrorism.

Theoretical Framework

This section goes in depth about the current struggles counter terror strategies have within the country of Yemen, mainly in their battle against AQAP and the way that community policing could help the country improve against AQAP and why it helps in these fights. Counter-terrorism strategies within Yemen have been highly unsuccessful due to numerous reasons, but the two largest reasons come from the stronghold that AQAP has been allowed to build in the southern region of the country and the fact that currently the counter-terrorism strategy is too closely linked to war like tactics used to

fight terrorism. Community policing allows for a softer approach against the terror group and allow a grassroots movement of the civilians to help fight back against AQAP in their own way.

The highly unsuccessful strategies in the struggle against AQAP stem from two major issues; the fact that the United States is leading the counter terror charge within the country, treating it as a foreign war instead of as a mainly homegrown issue within Yemen and the fact that AQAP was allowed to gain and maintain a stronghold within the southern region of Yemen. The current United States led counter terror strategy comes from the same tactics that are currently being used around the Middle East in war zones by American troops. This type of militaristic approach to counter terrorism will only reinforce the ideology that AQAP is feeding the people of Yemen about Western imperialization and that they are the enemy invading the holy land. It is this rhetoric that allows AQAP to recruit for the fight against the official Yemeni Government, as well as abroad against the Western powers. This current ideological path of recruiting is what makes AQAP the largest terrorist threat to the Western world, as seen in the *Charlie Habo* attacks in Paris. The other issue with this current war-like strategy that is being deployed in Yemen, is according to Christopher McIntosh is “Historically speaking, modern wars require negotiated conclusion or the complete eradication of present and future threats. The former is politically impossible and the latter is historically unachievable” (McIntosh 2015). These two historical outcomes are nearly impossible to execute when facing an ideologically driven enemy which leads them to be counterproductive in counter-terrorism because the violence only perpetuates more violence and hatred never allowing for a full dismantling of the terrorist group, always

leading to more terrorists being recruited. This current war-like counter-terrorism strategy is not the answer, and has never been a successful plan in order to defeat terrorism, so we must look to change this strategy in order to lessen the threat that AQAP presents both locally in Yemen and globally.

When fighting against terrorism there are two approaches that can be taken. First, there is the *hard power* approach which is the use of force and coercion typically by the use of the military, economic sanctions, or coercive tactics by the government to get the result desired. We see this in the current counter terror strategies implemented by the United States throughout the world. The second option is *soft power*, a term coined by Harvard professor Joseph Nye, refers to the ability to persuade or affect change through cultural influence and betterment of everyday life. Community policing is the best representation of soft power and is the answer to the current problem of an unsuccessful war-like counter-terrorism strategy. “AQAP has such a strong hold on the civilian population that the community population believes it has no other option but to give into the demands of AQAP. If community based policing was implemented it would give the civilian population an outlet to improve its situation without being controlled by AQAP” (Simcox 2015). As Simcox points out, the biggest weapon that can be used against AQAP is the civilian population itself. Using the civilian population as an extension of the governmental force, as seen in Israel, or as a working partnership with the government, as seen in the United Kingdom and the United States, can give the civilians an outlet to fight back, as well as hindering AQAP’s ability to recruit the local population weakening their stronghold. AQAP’s major recruiting ability was the ability to provide for the civilians every day necessities in Yemen better than either of the more *legitimate*

government forms in the current regime or the al-Houthi movement. Soft power has the ability to shift the civilian support towards the side of the Yemeni Government by allowing them to provide what they need instead of getting it from AQAP. With community policing the current regime could hinder AQAP's ability to grow throughout the country, and help improve the lives of its citizens improving the countries relationship.

Methods and Analysis

This study is a comparative case study of community policing and its effectiveness in the realm of counter-terrorism. I compare the way that the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel use different forms of community policing to help in their counter-terror efforts in their different circumstances. Taking into account each of the countries approaches to combat terrorism, I am able to assess which would most likely be able to help Yemen in its fight against AQAP. When given the opportunity to have multiple options that can be effective against counterterrorism operations, to be able to pick the best option is a luxury rarely seen in the realm of foreign policy. When looking at the United States and the United Kingdom, the positives that can be gained from community policing aspects in their counterterrorism efforts. Meanwhile, Israel has been using its community policing counter-terror model since 1974 in a volatile area of the world with significant amounts of success. So with all of the cases having relative success, these three cases seem to be the most relevant and fruitful examples of using community policing to fight terrorism. Seeing which of these options and the various adaptations of community policing would be most helpful within Yemen can change the

perceptions of how community policing impacts the fight against terrorism around the world.

The Israeli Model

Israel is the only Middle Eastern country that the study decided to include due to the fact that it is the most successful with their counter terrorism strategy. Located between Egypt and Lebanon with a partial coastline of the Mediterranean Sea, Israel was given an official statehood in 1948 following the end of World War 2 and has been marred by some form of military readiness from that day forward. Israel was never accepted by the Arab countries that surrounded the Jewish state. Palestine was given statehood around the same time and believed the land that was given to Israel should have been given to them, creating tensions between the countries since the inception. Israel fought a series of wars throughout the next half century against the surrounding Muslim countries and was able to fend for itself in the conventional wars. Counter terrorism has become more of a focus after more radical Muslim groups became more powerful throughout the surrounding countries, especially Palestine, at the turn of the century. With groups like Hamas and Hezbollah being given more legitimacy in the neighboring state has led to Israel deal with terrorism on a more regular basis, making them the only model that has to combat terrorism in the same manner that Yemen would.

“The police in Israel have a special role due to the unique security situation, ethnic diversity, and significant political, religious, and cultural differences and tensions. At the same time, Israel is a democratic country where the police are obligated to protect civil rights and are restrained and regulated by law, and where an independent Supreme Court plays a dominant role” (Perry and Tal 2014). Israel gives an interesting look at

what community policing can and cannot do for a country that is ravaged with terrorism and diversity being intertwined in everyday life. In Israel, unlike many of the other democracies around the world, counter-terrorism needs are not something that is new to them. Counter-terrorism has been on the radar of the Israel National Police (INP) since the country's inception. The INP has maintained a semi-militaristic set up in terms of its organizational structure, which allows it to be an efficient police force. Their many responsibilities as defined by law include, "preventing crime, investigating and clearing crime, identifying offenders and bringing them to justice, supervising and controlling traffic, maintaining public order and safety, and maintaining 'internal security'" (Perry and Tal 2014). This last responsibility of internal security was added following a rise of Palestinian terror attacks in 1974. However, it is also last on the list because as Peel suggested, the first duty of any police force is to the civilians of a given country, in this case Israel. This basic principles application also led to the formation of the largest volunteer organization in Israel, the Civil Guard, which consists of 75,000 volunteers helping local police in a variety of responsibilities. While the INP is largely similar to Western democracies in terms of organizational structures, they do have the glaring difference because the INP isn't solely responsible for keeping the peace, like a local law enforcement agencies in those Western democracies, the INP has other government agencies that oversee the public safety aspects.

The INP is not just about preventing and controlling terrorism. It is a much larger strategy designed to counter the goals of terrorist organizations by empowering the local population and providing a way for terrorism to be marginalized within the everyday life of the Israeli citizens. The INP face a very similar problem to the country of Yemen in

the fact that they can't just curb the threat of terrorism, they have such a problem with it they need to rid their country of the terrorist organization operating in the country. The INP has taken the approach of using the local population in a capacity that allows them to help hinder terrorist activity and even assist the police during terrorist attacks. This allows the citizens to feel like they are part of the fight against terrorism strengthening their bond with the police force in Israel. The INP also uses education in their community policing strategy to incorporate the citizens into the fight against terrorism.

“The police play a central role in educating members of the public, from an early age, to be aware of indications of possible terrorism events and to report their suspicions to the police. For example, police visit elementary schools to meet with children; they issue warning to be alert regarding suspicious objects or people in shopping areas; and they request that citizens provide information if they observe suspicious activities. In addition, once information about a terrorist in an area is available, the police immediately make announcements through the media, warning the public to stay away from crowded places and to be alert” (Wiseburd 2014).

This education that begins at a young age plays a huge role as it can shape the minds of the citizens at an impressionable age and demonstrates to those children, as well as the children's parents, that the police are there to help them help themselves. According to Wiseburd, this is a highly successful strategy proven by the over 200,000 calls received and respond to by the police bomb squad. While most of the tips are often false alarms, the police still respond as if it were a live threat in order to show the public they are responsive and encourage the public to continue helping the police in preventing terrorism. The largest force behind the cooperative effort of the civilians and the INP is the Civil Guard. This volunteer organization is made up of citizens, under the control and supervision of the police, who patrol local communities with the powers of police

officers. While the Civil Guard has many responsibilities and options for ways to volunteer, the largest and most significant on issues of homeland security. They help in a variety of ways such as crowd control following a terrorist attack, setting up roadblocks, and helping remove human remains in accordance with Jewish law. The types of responsibilities they continue to help soothe the transition between police and civilians in high tensions scenarios, where having a local face helps to ease the panic. The volunteers work with the local operation centers to prevent terrorist and criminal activities in their home communities. Allowing these volunteers to patrol their local areas with the authority to curb not only terrorism, but also other local criminal issues, builds trust between the police and the community.

“The Israeli model for policing terrorism seeks to minimize the impacts of terrorism on the everyday routines of Israeli citizens. Simply stated, its goal is to allow the population to act as if terrorism did not exist, even during periods in which terrorist threats are high” (Wiseburd 2014). The Israeli Government has made its counter-terrorism approach focus around the community. They do not want to allow terrorists to hinder the day-to-day lives of their citizens and this puts the police in a positive light in the eyes of those who they swear to serve and protect. These positive attitudes towards police then makes the citizens want to go out and help in the fight by joining the Civil Guard and creating a cycle that hinders the ability of terrorists to operate in the local areas.

The United Kingdom Model

The United Kingdom has taken a new approach to their counter-terrorism efforts since the attacks since the terror attacks in London and Glasgow. “In dealing with the

threat posed by Islamic terrorism, the UK has deployed a multi-faceted strategy called CONTEST (an acronym for “Counter-Terrorism Strategy”), which aims to “Pursue”, “Prevent”, “Protect”, and “Prepare” the country in the face of potential terrorist attacks” (Bonino 2012). To complete this multi-faceted strategy, they employ both high policing methods and low policing methods to best operate their counterterror strategies. The best example of the UK using community policing in a counter-terrorism capacity is the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), a specialized unit within the Metropolitan Police.

In a topic as broad as counter-terrorism, the two major schools of thoughts are high policing, or hard power, and low policing, or soft power. High policing is what Americans think about most often when talking about counter-terrorism as it brings in the aspects of infringing upon the civil rights of the populous in order to stop terrorism. Hard policing in the sense of the UK counter-terrorism strategy has been admittedly used. “In deploying massive anti-terrorist legislation, surveillance and control the British Government openly admitted that, in dealing with terrorist threats and extreme Islamism, ‘some of our counter-terrorist powers will be disproportionately experienced by people in the Muslim community’” (Bonino 2012). This usage of hard policing in the UK is shown in the “pursue” and “prevent” portions of their counter-terrorism strategy. The usage of high policing puts a large strain on the relationship between the police and the civilians because of its intrusive nature on the civilians. We have also seen this type of high policing in the United States’ “War on Terror” strategy in a short-term solution to a long-term problem. While there is a time, place and condition in which every country must use high policing tactics, its necessity is to be used sparingly by the British in their counter-terror strategy. Low policing is what we have been focusing on in this study, community

policing and playing the “long game” in order to eliminate terrorism through ending the grassroots spread. “This model aims to employ community-based counter-terrorism approaches to impact Muslim communities and improve communications, marginalize extremists and favor social integration” (Bonino 2012). This model is also called the inclusionary model because of its ability to bring a marginalized section of the populous and bring them into the fold of the country, making them feel like it is their country as well instead of outsiders in a foreign land. The reason this philosophy is so successful is because it reduces the ability of terrorist organizations to recruit as many members within the UK by reducing the number of marginalized members of the country. “In Line with the low policing strand of CONTEST mentioned before, community policing activities could promote better dialogue; isolate extremists; and further social integration of Muslim with the wider society” (Bonino 2012). Britain uses an interesting combination of high and low policing methods to further the country’s fight against homegrown terrorism.

One of the most successful ways that the United Kingdom has employed is the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU). This is the best example of community policing within the United Kingdom by being a small unit that specializing in community policing within the Muslim communities. The current MCU commander is Robert Lambert, who Bonino quotes as saying,

“When torture is replaced by trust building you have the basis of a solid partnership that can reduce the impact of al-Qaida propaganda in the communities where it seeks recruits and supporters. It has also the potential to address the real root causes of terrorism and provide viable alternatives for young people.”

Having the leader of an agency such as the MCU, whose purpose is to go out and actively engage the Muslim community shows the concerted effort by the authoritative figure to the marginalized community to improve the situation. However, according to Basia Spalek, the authoritative figure of the MCU may not be the only thing necessary to truly reach the community as a whole. Spalek asserts that there may need to be a ‘connector’ position as well. These connectors are people who are from and still in the community, like guidance counselors, social workers and young professionals in the community, who can bridge the gap and bring the two sides closer. Spalek continues “Within the context of countering takfiri jihadist terrorism, connectors seem to be people who are able to negotiate ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ in order to build relationships with people so as to create environments conducive to implanting counter-terrorism initiatives” (Spalek 2014). These connectors can prove to be the element that brings the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism plan truly successful. The community trusts these connectors to do what is best for the communities because of the inherently tight knit communities that Muslim communities tend to have. Much like the Israeli Civil Guard, Spalek contends that it is important to have these connectors responding to threats of violence. In an interview with a Muslim community member, he spoke about an interaction the community had when a racist group was holding a march in their community,

“...on the day I managed to speak to young people and dissuaded about a group of 20 to leave you, the area and go back, because I knew them... so they left. So again, that relationship building, the police were seeing that happening... the Silver Commander (senior police officer) on the ground was about to do something and I was there at the time and I felt that if he’d done that it wouldn’t have worked, so he pulled me to the side and we spoke.” (Spalek 2014)

The police response to certain incidents that happen within the community is seen as marginalizing the community. However, if a member of that community acts as a middle man between the civilians and the police it can deescalate the situation and have a positive outcome overall.

The United Kingdom has a progressive take on counter-terrorism, bringing in both high and low policing methods to balance the pressures on the community with their involvement in the overall country. The UK does a great job using specialized groups like the MCU to continue to work with Muslim communities in counter-terror efforts. As well, the UK uses connectors within the community to help ease the tensions should they arise between the police and the civilian population.

The American Model

The United States has become the leader for the counterterrorism movement in recent history. Following the events of September 11th, 2001, the world's superpower became the first in the fight against Al-Qaeda throughout the Middle East. Counter terrorism became looked at as something that could be solved through military actions as that was the first way that the United States tried to combat the violence. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States led military first operations that didn't have the intended result of stamping out terrorism and stopping organizations from furthering their recruiting processes and eliminating the threat they pose to exterior governments. It wasn't until the Obama administration took control that community policing was looked at as a manner for fighting against terrorism, particularly against the homegrown terrorism that began to become more commonplace. Homegrown terrorism is the act of terrorism perpetuated by American citizens, either at home or abroad according to the

Congressional Research Service. As homegrown terrorism grew, the United States realized that the fight against terrorism, mainly al-Qaeda and its affiliates, could not be a military endeavor and needed to be fought with a different mentality.

This section shows the American model for community policing as a counter-terrorism method. I start by giving the American definition of community policing and the effects that has on the strategy. The American model of community policing as a manner of counter-terrorism strategy takes bits and pieces from both the British model and the Israeli model that allow them to focus on maximizing the effectiveness of community policing benefits. “The United States Department of Justice has defined community policing as a philosophy that focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police services that includes aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as prevention, problem-solving, community engagement and partnerships” (Docobo). This definition is the code in which the American model is focused on in a manner that brings people together as opposed to having the citizens fear the police. Author Ben Brown breaks this theory down in even more detail when he goes into his opinion of the American model of community policing, “At its core, community policing is composed of two essential elements: (i) quality relations between law enforcement and the citizenry, and (ii) concerted problem-solving efforts among law enforcement officers and local residents which focus on identifying and eliminating the cause of crime in the community” (Brown 2013). This more simplistic version of the Department of Justice’s definition rings similar to the other uses of community policing around the world. These can be seen as common threads throughout the cases as the basis for the community policing as a counter-terrorism strategies. However, to the best of my research abilities,

the American model is the only one that tries to put an actual definition to the put the practice into words. This aspect is different from the rest of the world because it not only gives police a better understanding of what is to be expected from them and it allows the citizenry to understand what is to be expected from the police. When the citizenry can hold the governmental forces accountable for their actions, and how they operate, it can be beneficial to the end product; which in terms of counter-terrorism can mean a more successful partnership between the citizenry and the government.

The American model takes many different aspects of community policing that we have seen around the world be highly successful. First, they took the British model and adapted their practices in their own way. “The core goal of the new U.S. strategy (community policing as a counter-terrorism method) is ‘to prevent violent extremist and their supports from inspiring, radicalizing, financing or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence. This initiative, at least in its core focus, closely emulates the goal of Prevent” (Brown 2013). The movement to prevent terror before it happens shows the change in philosophy from the United States. They have shifted to a proactive form of counter-terrorism, much like each of the other cases, which allows the country to involve the citizenry in the information gathering process. This new role for the citizenry brings the next important change to the counter-terrorism strategy, the aspect of relationship building. Relationship building is the backbone of a community policing strategy in its truest form, but is especially important for counter-terrorism implications. When the relationships are built, it gives an extreme advantage for law enforcement because the citizenry knows their neighborhoods better than law enforcement ever can as an outsider. As author Jose Decobo states, “It will generally be

citizens who observe the unusual – groups of men living in apartments or motels, or unusual behavior at flight schools – in their own community, and would be expected to report such observations to the local police” (Decobo). These small changes can be reported if the relationship between law enforcement and the citizens is strong, while if it is not built, these proactive tips the police can potentially receive fall through the crack. The key to the success of relationship building is not focusing solely on terrorism as the only issue. As Dan Silk points out, “This represents a key consideration for U.S. law enforcement agencies as they seek to build genuine partnerships with these neighborhoods. Close, productive relationships between police and the community defy artificially imposed boundaries, yet they periodically may emphasize counter-terrorism” (Silk 2012). This key consideration can be toppled however if law enforcement doesn’t embrace the Peelian principles of community policing. Grabosky points out, “Regardless of terrorist threats; day-to-day protection of the community remains the responsibility of local police. It is now generally accepted that mutual respect and trust between police and the communities they serve are essential” (Grabosky 2008). Especially within the US, terrorists often use common crimes to fund their activities, and that is when the community is the proactive member of community policing, pointing out those who start to go outside of their norms, or the community norms, to the police.

The last way the American model emulates the models of the other cases is the use of volunteer resources. Much like the Civil Guard in Israel, President George W. Bush called for “greater citizen involvement in homeland security through initiatives such as the Citizen Corps and Freedom Corps” (Docobo). Following 9/11, the Citizen Corps was separated into four different groups and methods that could affect help;

Neighborhood Watch, Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS), Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), and Medical Reserve Corps (MRC). Neighborhood Watch programs have been in practice for over three decades, however following 9/11, they have slightly changed their role to now include terrorism awareness. Teaching those in their communities about what signs to look for and what may be helpful to police when suspicious activities do take place. It also acts as the same role as the “connector” roles seen in the United Kingdom. Volunteers in Police Service are in place to perform duties that allow sworn officers to focus on other, more priority, duties that they have. With the increase of duties that are asked of law enforcement following September 11th, this allows the police to be out in the communities, serving the citizenry with day-to-day crime and building a relationship within the district they have been assigned. Community Emergency Response Teams are civilians who have been trained in emergency planning and response in order to assist law enforcement should an attack happen. Following the move into the Citizen Corps, CERT teams have increased their job responsibilities in order to be able to provide assistance not only to first responders but to victims themselves, as well as being able to bring together volunteers from within the community at a disaster site. They also help prepare their communities for disasters to improve its safety when an attack has not happened yet. Lastly, the Medical Reserve Corps is a group of citizens with a background or interest in the medical field who can assist the EMT’s and medical professionals in times of crisis. They can also provide knowledge on how the community should prepare themselves in terms of medical supplies and strategies to be prepared for any incident that may come. These volunteer outlets are created by the relationships brought about by community policing.

How does this affect Yemen?

Yemen as a test case made for a variety of positives and negatives for each of the models of community policing that I looked into. With only one overwhelming negative seen throughout each case makes it difficult to say that any of these methods would benefit Yemen. However, if the negative aspect of the need for a strong centralized government could be fixed, the positives that each of these models bring could truly change the future of Yemen and help the fight against terrorism around the world.

Each of the cases I studied were excellent examples on how community policing could hinder terrorist activity within the country, I also picked three countries with solid, highly functioning central governments to help run their versions of community policing. Yemen does not yet have this strong centralized government, as it is not only fighting AQAP, which has made a case to become the new Government of Yemen, but also the al-Houthi rebels who have been fighting against the regime for almost its entire existence. Without a strong central government, you have no foundation for a community policing system, and currently the country of Yemen does not have any resemblance of a strong central government making it nearly impossible to implement the best strategy to defeat AQAP. Common trends among the models such as volunteer forces and relationship building between the community and the officers rely on the fact that the government is running efficiently enough to put these programs into place.

While we can see the downfall of not having a governing body that is well functioning and strong, that alone doesn't discount many of the ideas and themes of the other models as possible solutions for the Yemeni problem with terrorism. Incorporating

the civilian population within your counter terrorism plan would be an extremely successful plan of action for the country of Yemen. With Yemen having twenty-two governorates, basically states, allowing for these different governorates to provide their own protection against AQAP you will see the additional manpower and resources being added to the fight. If implemented like the Israeli Civil Guard with standing positions and an eye on dealing with local problems in order to allow the well trained professionals to handle actual terrorist threats it would help rebuild the trust between the government and the civilian population. You will create a better equipped fighting force by following the western lead of allowing the civilian population to help themselves as well as the country in the fight against AQAP.

Another major feature of community policing that can allow Yemen to combat AQAP's activity in the country is an educational process to allow the youth of the country. This would create a grassroots movement that would further detract from AQAP's ability to recruit from these at risk populations within the country. However, while education may be easier in the western powers like the United Kingdom and the United States, you see the Israeli use of the educational system in order to help defeat terrorism as a method that can help long term over short term. The way the Israeli's approach teaching children about terrorism, and what they should do if they see or know of terrorism would be much more effective than the western ways for Yemen because both Yemen and Israel have terrorism actively on the mind every day. It is a way of life in both countries and that allows the children to start with a better understanding of the damage that can be done by terrorists. By starting the educational process early in life, you allow generational change to take place, the children will grow up knowing the

dangers of terrorism along with ways that the government is asking for their help to fight terrorism will change the culture surrounding terrorism in the country, making it a civilian led campaign to stop terrorism.

When looking at the three different models I've applied to Yemen, the Israeli Model is the most efficient for implementation and effectiveness. The reasoning behind this is because of the proximity to the terrorism itself. When you look at the United Kingdom and United States Models, they have both been highly successful in stopping terrorism from popping up in their country, however does not do much in order to solve the actual problem of terrorism. In Israel, as well as Yemen, terrorism is part of everyday life. The terrorists are much more likely to live in your city, be your neighbor and be known to you. It is already an established part of life, and it is much more difficult to root out something that has already been established in your country. The Yemeni Government, once it has solidified and strengthened itself within the country, can follow the Israeli Model more easily because the Israeli Model came about when the country was created. The Yemeni Government can add the counter terrorism strategies to their new model for government after figuring out their downfalls that stop them from being as successful as other governments in the region.

Conclusion

This section is going to be a brief overview of the study where I review the project as it stands. Following that I review the flaws within my own research, mainly the issue with trying to implement community policing in a country where the central government is in shambles and the difficulties of how we are defining what community

truly is. Lastly, I look towards what future researchers could study in order to add onto my research.

I began this project with a simple question, how would adopting community policing concepts help the fight against AQAP? Throughout the paper, we looked at the current strategies that were being discussed and implemented into Yemen to fight the terrorist organization along with how countries have used community policing in order to strengthen their own country's counter-terrorism procedures. The outcome being that it seems where it has been put into effect, community policing has been extremely successful in hindering terrorist movements and attacks by combining certain community policing principles with other, more traditional, counter-terrorism measures as seen in all three cases. Unfortunately, none of these cases have the ability to be replicated or even modeled after because of the lack of a central Government in Yemen. This lack of governmental control leads to an inability to implement the necessary help for the community to get involved with the fight against AQAP in the country. This also hinders any counter-terror plan from being able to be put into effect because the government does not have enough control within its own borders to implement a cohesive strategy.

When delving deeper into the problems of Yemen, I believe that there are two major areas of research that could make a large contribution not only to the world of academia but also to the practice of counter-terrorism and unity within Middle Eastern countries. The first area of research continuation that is integral to the process of defeating AQAP is how one could bring together the two sides to form a stronger government in Yemen to help the countries fight against the terrorist organization. In doing this, I believe that it would open avenues to help bring the country together and

empower the citizens to join the fight with community policing to push back AQAP. Once the country was able to come together as a unified front, it allows for more strategies to be on the table when talking about ways that the country can fight back against terrorism. The other area of research to consider is an actual implementation strategy for community policing in the country. It was a theme I saw throughout many of the current research articles, that implementation strategy is one of the most important factors of community policing because if done improperly it can have disastrous consequences for both the government agencies as well as the civilians attempting to help them. This is a factor because with how the country of Yemen currently is, it would be much harder to implement a strategy like the United States or United Kingdom models, however if it could be worked into the DNA of the country, like it is in the Israeli model it could seamlessly be transitioned to. While community based policing does seem to be the best option in terms of stopping terrorism, the country of Yemen has some work to do before it becomes a viable option to fight against AQAP in the region.

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